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Abstract: 
 
Family firms' decisions to hire nonfamily managers are influenced by agency costs, 
socioemotional wealth concerns, and the availability of high-quality nonfamily managers in the 
labor pool. We hypothesize that owing to these factors, family ownership and intrafamily 
succession intentions will be negatively associated with the proportion of nonfamily managers in 
private small- and medium-sized (SME) family firms. However, firm size is hypothesized to 
positively moderate those relationships because as family firm size increases, the benefits of 
hiring nonfamily managers rise faster than the costs. Tobit regression analyses of 7,299 private 
SMEs support our hypotheses. 
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Introduction: 
 
The extent of family ownership and the intention for intrafamily succession can lead to strategic 
decisions and behaviors that differentiate family firms from nonfamily firms (Chua, Chrisman, & 
Sharma, 1999) and create heterogeneity among family firms (Chua, Chrisman, Steier, & 
Rau, 2012; De Massis, Kotlar, Chua, & Chrisman, 2014; Melin & Nordqvist, 2007). One factor 
of importance is the extent to which nonfamily members are included in the management team, 
since their presence can affect the short- and long-term achievement of a family firm's economic 
and noneconomic goals (Chrisman, Memili, & Misra, 2014). 
 
The role of nonfamily managers in family firms has been explored in the literature (e.g., 
Blumentritt, Keyt, & Astrachan, 2007; Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004), but numerous gaps 
remain. Most notably, although the economic and noneconomic rationales of family owners for 
employing nonfamily managers have been discussed (Carney, 2005; Verbeke & Kano, 2012), 
there is a paucity of empirical studies on how family ownership and transgenerational succession 
intentions influence the employment of nonfamily managers. The family's control of the firm 
through ownership is critical, as it provides the family the autonomy to pursue its interests 
through the firm. Therefore, family control is recognized as having both economic and 
socioemotional consequences. Likewise, the intentions to transfer control of a firm to future 
generations of family owners is not only ostensibly a socioemotional concern, but also both 
influences rely upon the underlying economic feasibility of the firm. Furthermore, because 
family ownership is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for intrafamily succession to occur, 
the two are related, yet have distinct influences on the extent to which nonfamily managers are 
employed in the firm. Thus, these two concerns are “complementary rather than alternative 
explanations for variations among family firms and, by implication, differences between family 
and non-family firms” (Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012, p. 852). 
 
Although the temporal dynamics of the family have been recognized (Sharma, Salvato, & 
Reay, 2014), other equally important factors—such as firm size—that do not vary uniformly 
over time have been under-researched in a family firm setting. Although firm size has been 
recognized as an important contingency factor (Gómez-Mejía, Cruz, Berrone, & De 
Castro, 2011), studies usually treat firm size as a control variable, assuming that its only effect 
on firm behavior and performance is direct. However, examining only the direct impact of firm 
characteristics such as size fails to recognize that as firms change, so might family and firm goals 
(Kotlar, Fang, De Massis, & Frattini, 2014). This may alter how other characteristics, such as 
family ownership and succession intentions, influence important decisions regarding firm 
strategy and governance, including those pertaining to hiring nonfamily managers (Kotey & 
Folker, 2007). As nonfamily managers often play a key role in family firms, theory seeking to 
increase our understanding of family firms needs to take the influence of variables such as size 
more fully into account. Indeed, previous research suggests that family firms often follow an 
idiosyncratic pattern of growth and that traditional wisdom coming from the study of nonfamily 
firms cannot always be directly applied to family firms (Colombo, De Massis, Piva, Rossi-
Lamastra, & Wright, 2014). 
 
This study intends to address this issue by investigating how the extent of family ownership and 
intentions for transgenerational family control of the firm influences decisions to hire nonfamily 
managers and how those relationships are moderated by firm size. We use Tobit regression to 
analyze these relationships among a sample of 7,299 privately held, small- and medium-sized 
(SME) firms with family involvement in ownership. We focus on SMEs (those with 5–500 
employees) so that our results are not confounded by the fact that firm size can influence 
decisions to hire nonfamily managers simply because there are limits to the number of family 
members available to meet the demand for managers as a family firm grows. We also wanted to 
ensure that our sample was composed of firms where the family has substantial ownership and 
significant discretionary power to make important decisions, such as whether to hire nonfamily 
managers (Cromie, Stephenson, & Monteith, 1995). 
 
Theoretically, we posit that hiring nonfamily managers creates a separation between ownership 
and control, which can increase agency costs (e.g., Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009) and reduce 
economic performance. Furthermore, hiring nonfamily managers decreases socioemotional 
wealth, a key concern for family firms (Berrone, Cruz, & Gómez-Mejía, 2012). Finally, family 
ownership and intrafamily succession intentions can have a deleterious effect on the perceptions 
of prospective nonfamily managers with respect to career opportunities and just treatment 
(Verbeke & Kano, 2012), which can reduce the quality of the available labor pool and the 
perceived benefits to family owners of hiring nonfamily managers (Chrisman et al., 2014). Taken 
together, these factors suggest that both ownership and intrafamily succession intentions will be 
negatively related to the proportion of nonfamily managers employed in family firms. 
 
On the other hand, as size increases, family firms are more likely to professionalize, institute 
formal agency cost control mechanisms (Chittoor & Das, 2007), and appreciate high 
performance as a means of achieving both economic and noneconomic goals. These factors may 
increase career opportunities, decrease favoritism in performance evaluations, and diminish 
information asymmetries, giving family firms access to a higher quality managerial labor pool. 
Thus, size decreases the costs and increases the benefits of using nonfamily managers in family 
firms. As such, we expect size to moderate the relationship between family ownership and 
intrafamily succession intentions and the employment of nonfamily managers. 1 
 
We contribute to the literature by testing relationships that have previously only been 
conjectured but are of fundamental importance to family firms (Chua, Chrisman, & 
Sharma, 2003). The results of our study indicate that both family ownership and intentions for 
transgenerational succession are negatively related to the proportion of nonfamily managers in 
family firms. More importantly, we address whether size, a variable typically used as a control, 
might have greater theoretical and empirical significance in a family business setting. We find 
that size moderates the impact of family ownership and succession intentions on the employment 
of nonfamily managers by reducing their negative influence. More generally, our findings 
suggest that size changes the perceptions of family owners–managers about how nonfamily 
managers impact firm governance and goal achievement. In our study, we show that the direct 
effect of size may be less important than its moderating effect. In other words, it is not just 
supply–demand issues associated with size that influences the employment of nonfamily 
managers. Rather, it is that the agency and socioemotional wealth issues associated with the 
employment of nonfamily managers fade in importance as a firm grows, owing to an increase in 
the benefits associated with the separation of ownership and control (Cruz, Gómez-Mejía, & 
Becerra, 2010; Fama & Jensen, 1983). This suggests that variables such as size may lead to 
differences in both the type and degree of unique behaviors exhibited by family firms. 
 
Theory and Hypothesis 
 
To describe how family ownership, intrafamily succession, and size impact the proportion of 
nonfamily managers in family firms, we rely on agency theory, socioemotional wealth 
considerations, and the employment preferences of nonfamily managers. 
 
Family Ownership and the Employment of Nonfamily Managers 
 
Within the domain of agency theory, a principal–agent relationship emerges when an owner hires 
and delegates authority to a manager with the expectation that the manager will act in the best 
interest of the owner (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). According to Jensen and Meckling (1994), 
agency problems arise from interest divergence, which motivates managers to engage in 
opportunistic behaviors, and information asymmetries, which make such behaviors difficult to 
detect. In response, owners may invest resources to monitor and provide incentives to managers 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Hence, agency costs consist of the costs of controlling agent behavior and the 
residual loss that occurs from opportunistic behavior that is not or cannot be controlled. Owners 
bear the brunt of these costs, which, unlike the private benefits of control, are shared 
proportionally. So, as an owner's stake increases, so does the incentive to minimize agency costs. 
 
In general, research has indicated that agency costs are lower in family firms (Chrisman 
et al., 2004; Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Lester, 2011). Theoretically, this is assumed to be the 
case because agency conflicts and costs occur in different ways when there is a familial 
association between owners and managers. Although distinct agency conflicts based on altruism 
may arise (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001), agency theorists have suggested that 
when owners and managers share family ties, conflicts of interest are minimized because family 
involvement facilitates the alignment of interests among owners and managers (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, because by definition nonfamily managers 
do not share familial ties with family firm owners, they are less likely to be privy to the familial 
dynamics that allow family managers to function with reduced agency conflict. As such, 
nonfamily managers may be more prone to act opportunistically (Ilias, 2006; Wu, James, Wang, 
& Jung, 2012). 
 
Additionally, family social ties and shared history reduces information asymmetries between 
family principals and family agents. Family principals therefore have the ability to use both 
informal monitoring mechanisms and familial sanctions to control the behavior of the latter, 
which limits the emergence of opportunism among family agents and reduces the need to invest 
in costly formal control mechanisms (Pollak, 1985). Unfortunately, the misalignments that can 
occur between nonfamily managers and family owners are exacerbated by the tendency of the 
family owners to rely on informal control mechanisms better suited for monitoring family rather 
than nonfamily agents (Chua et al., 2009). As a result, it is not surprising that family owners are 
often reluctant to hire nonfamily managers (Ilias, 2006) who often require different and more 
expensive methods of control. 
 
Nevertheless, nonfamily managers may provide family firms with access to skill sets not 
available from family members (Bennedsen, Nielsen, Pérez-González, & Wolfenzon, 2007; 
Carney, 2005). The managerial labor market is likely to contain individuals more qualified than 
the limited number of family members available for employment in the firm (Chrisman 
et al., 2014). Assuming that the family firm can draw from the entire labor market pool, family 
owners may be faced with a choice between family managers who are presumed to have lower 
ability but put forth greater effort, and nonfamily managers who are presumed to put forth less 
effort but have greater ability (Verbeke & Kano, 2012). 
 
In addition, the literature also acknowledges the importance of noneconomic goals (Chrisman, 
Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012) and socioemotional wealth within family firms, which emanate 
from family ownership (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Monyano-
Fuentes, 2007; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011). Almost by definition, nonfamily managers are less 
likely to contribute to or benefit from noneconomic goals that lead to socioemotional wealth. 
Furthermore, the presence of nonfamily managers may restrict the family's discretion to act 
altruistically and otherwise divert resources and pass control to family members (Chua 
et al., 2009; De Massis, Chua, & Chrisman, 2008). This may decrease the willingness of family 
owners to hire nonfamily managers as they perceive them as unable to contribute to the 
achievement of family-oriented noneconomic goals that create socioemotional wealth. 
 
Conversely, family ownership in firms may also discourage some nonfamily managers from 
pursuing employment in family firms. For instance, nonfamily managers may worry about 
procedural and distributive justice in family firms (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006; Colombo 
et al., 2014). Nonfamily managers may perceive active family owners as a factor restricting their 
potential for career advancement, and instead prefer employment with high-performing 
nonfamily firms (Block, 2011). Finally, high family ownership may signal relatively poor human 
resource practices (Carlson, Upton, & Seaman, 2006) and limited opportunities for training (De 
Massis, 2012; Kotey & Folker, 2007). 
 
Noneconomic goals are more difficult to communicate than economic goals (Mitchell, Morse, & 
Sharma, 2003), in part because noneconomic performance, being subjective in nature, is harder 
to measure than economic performance. The pursuit of noneconomic goals that create 
socioemotional wealth in family firms is also likely to lead to idiosyncratic strategies and 
behaviors (Carney, 2005; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011). Since the effectiveness of managers is 
dependent upon their ability to understand and facilitate the achievement of goals, nonfamily 
managers, who are not part of the family, may be at a disadvantage in situations where family-
centered noneconomic goals and socioemotional wealth are important (Chrisman et al., 2014; 
Chua et al., 2009). These information asymmetries may create further barriers for the career 
advancement and self-development of nonfamily managers (Colombo et al., 2014). In addition, 
nonfamily managers may not be completely compensated for their performance (Block, 2011), 
because family owners may be biased in their evaluations and expectations (Chrisman et al.; 
Chua et al.) or place a higher priority on contributions to the family's socioemotional wealth than 
on the firm's economic performance (Berrone et al., 2012). 
 
It may also be the case that nonfamily managers possess certain personal traits that are 
incompatible with the organizational culture in family firms (Barnett, Long, & Marler, 2012; 
Chirico & Nordqvist, 2010). Owning families often build complex yet conflicted sets of 
identities in family firms (Shepherd & Haynie, 2009), and nonfamily managers may have 
difficulties in dealing with these organizational identities. Overall, working in family firms often 
requires a high degree of socialization before nonfamily managers are able to acquire even a 
moderate understanding of the goals, values, and norms of the family (Blumentritt et al., 2007), 
some of which may be in conflict with their own agendas (Hall & Nordqvist, 2008). 
 
Attenuated career opportunities, noneconomic goals, favoritism, and lack of justice serve to 
reduce the pool of nonfamily candidates for managerial positions in family firms (Chrisman 
et al., 2014). However, owing to the ubiquity of family firms, the pool of potential nonfamily 
managers will be reduced, but not eliminated. Labor market sorting will lead to the most 
qualified candidates eschewing employment in family firms, turning instead to more attractive 
options in nonfamily firms, because they can (Schulze et al., 2001). Less qualified candidates 
will not be able to be as selective. 
 
What this means for our theory is that family owners must necessarily draw from a lower quality 
labor pool, which will reduce the benefits of hiring nonfamily managers and thus reduce their 
willingness to do so. However, potential agency problems still remain, just with fewer offsetting 
benefits owing to the lower probability of obtaining higher quality personnel (vis-à-vis family 
managers). In fact, the potential for agency problems may actually increase, because if less 
qualified employees are utility maximizers, they will gain greater utility by expending less effort; 
owing to their lower abilities, greater effort is less likely to pay off (Chua et al., 2009). 
 
In summary, the agency risks combined with the potential loss of socioemotional wealth 
associated with the hiring of nonfamily managers may be perceived to exceed the potential 
economic benefits that those managers are able to provide to the firm. Since ownership confers 
the discretion and power to use the firm as the owner(s) sees fit (Carney, 2005), we argue that the 
incentive and motivation to hire nonfamily managers will be directly proportional to the level of 
family ownership and control. Thus, as expressed below, an increase in family ownership should 
be associated with a decrease in the proportion of nonfamily managers. 
 
 Hypothesis 1: Family ownership is negatively associated with the proportion of 
nonfamily managers in family firms. 
 
Intrafamily Succession and the Employment of Nonfamily Managers 
Although family ownership is a necessary ingredient for the pursuit and preservation of 
socioemotional wealth, transgenerational succession intentions have specifically been 
highlighted as a primary component of family governance that reflects underlying goals of 
socioemotional wealth preservation (Berrone et al., 2012; Chrisman et al., 2012; Chua 
et al., 1999; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011). Indeed, transgenerational succession intentions have 
been shown to increase owners' perceptions of the monetary value of the firm, thus serving to 
illustrate a fundamental and significant differentiating factor of family firms (Zellweger 
et al., 2012). By contrast, risks to transgenerational succession often come from intrafamily 
conflict that threatens socioemotional wealth, making the continuation of the firm as a family 
institution of dubious value (De Massis et al., 2008; Eddleston, Otondo, & Kellermanns, 2008). 
Together, these arguments and this evidence suggest a series of implications for the role of 
nonfamily managers in family firms. 
 
Specifically, the employment of nonfamily managers and resulting potential for diluted family 
control can frustrate intentions and plans for intrafamily succession (Sonfield & Lussier, 2009). 
Likewise, conflicts between potential successors and nonfamily managers is a major factor that 
can prevent intrafamily succession from occurring (De Massis et al., 2008). Furthermore, family 
firms that are reliant on nonfamily managers may be less capable in transferring firm-specific 
tacit knowledge to potential family successors (Chirico & Nordqvist, 2010). Finally, since the 
satisfaction of the successor is heavily dependent upon perceptions of the incumbent's 
willingness to transfer leadership control (Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 2003), even well-meaning 
“seat-warmer” strategies involving the temporary appointment of a nonfamily chief executive 
officer (CEO) can backfire (Lee, Lim, & Lim, 2003). Thus, family firms with transgenerational 
succession intentions may prefer to reserve managerial positions for family members. 
 
On the other side of the coin, competent professional agents may not be attracted to family firms 
that are committed to intrafamily succession, as such intentions signal the presence of a family-
centered culture or identity with which, as discussed above, nonfamily managers may not feel 
compatible (Blumentritt et al., 2007). In addition, successful transgenerational succession often 
requires strong interactions between key family and nonfamily employees, and nonfamily 
managers may perceive this to conflict with their professional development and self-interest 
(Hall & Nordqvist, 2008). Finally, intentions for intrafamily succession among family owners 
effectively eliminate the opportunity for nonfamily managers to become CEO, which may be 
enough to discourage ambitious candidates from applying for a position with a family firm. 
Again, since it is the most qualified candidates who have the most employment options, the 
negative sorting that occurs diminishes the likelihood of a family firm being able to hire top-
quality management talent, which reinforces the proclivity of family firms to stick with family 
managers whenever possible. Thus: 
 
 Hypothesis 2: Transgenerational succession intention is negatively associated with the 
proportion of nonfamily managers in family firms. 
 
Although these initial hypotheses should be generally relevant in family firms, we posit that 
these relationships can significantly vary depending on firm size. In the following sections, we 
argue that when family firms grow larger, the hypothesized negative effects of both family 
ownership and transgenerational succession intention become weaker. 
 
Firm Size, Family Ownership, and the Employment of Nonfamily Managers 
 
Theory and research suggest that an overreliance on family management may negatively impact 
performance owing to the restricted skill sets of family members that take managerial positions 
(Gubitta & Gianecchini, 2002; Karra, Tracey, & Phillips, 2006; Stewart & Hitt, 2012). This 
concern becomes more pivotal in large family firms (Barber, Wesson, Roberson, & 
Taylor, 1999; Heneman, Tansky, & Camp, 2000). Managerial tasks in larger firms are more 
complex, and hence, the capabilities of firm managers become more important (Deshpande & 
Golhar, 1994). Consequently, professionalization becomes imperative, and hiring and promoting 
managers based on family-centered criteria rather than business qualifications are less acceptable 
(Chrisman et al., 2004; Jensen & Meckling, 1994; Schulze et al., 2001). As this suggests, 
recruiting nonfamily managers may help family firms overcome the inherent limitations of 
family management and improve effectiveness (Astrachan & Kolenko, 1994; Bennedsen 
et al., 2007; Ensley, 2006; Lester & Cannella, 2006; Martínez, Stöhr, & Quiroga, 2007), which is 
particularly important as the family firm gets bigger (Chittoor & Das, 2007; Sonfield & 
Lussier, 2009). 
 
Furthermore, larger family firms have more resources with which to devise formal monitoring 
systems to ensure that managers comply with the mandates of owners, and to provide incentive 
compensation systems to align the interests of managers with owners; potentially reducing the 
risk of agency conflict and costs in hiring nonfamily managers (Carlson et al., 2006). Larger size 
could also lead to economies of scale in the design and implementation of such systems, making 
the control of nonfamily agents relatively less expensive and more effective than would be the 
case in smaller firms (Grandori, 2004). Such tactics serve to both protect the family firm against 
the agency conflicts commonly associated with the hiring of nonfamily managers as well as 
serve to increase the attractiveness of working in family firms to competent managers. 
 
Overall, as firms get larger, hiring nonfamily managers should be more attractive to family 
owners. This is partially because specialized managerial ability becomes relatively more 
important than agency costs (Fama & Jensen, 1983), which may be proportionally lower as firms 
get larger. Another reason is that the prominence of socioemotional wealth as a driver of decision 
making tends to wane as size increases (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007, 2011). 
 
Since owners share the economic benefits accruing from firm performance, and discretion and 
power are proportional to the family's ownership stake, the hypothesized negative relationship 
between family ownership and nonfamily management is expected to be attenuated as the firm 
grows larger. However, the moderating effect of size is also influenced by the preferences of 
managers and hence the characteristics of the labor pool from which family firms can draw. 
From the perspective of nonfamily managers, size may mitigate some of the negative effects of 
family ownership. Larger firms have higher social visibility. In the case of family businesses, 
increased firm size brings more attention from nonfamily stakeholders (King & Lenox, 2000; 
Lepoutre & Heene, 2006), who may press for conformance to prevailing industry norms and best 
practices in areas such as human resource management (Carlson et al., 2006; Parada, Nordqvist, 
& Gimeno, 2010). 
 
Furthermore, larger family firms should provide greater career opportunities (Sonfield & 
Lussier, 2009) and are more likely to be professionalized, reducing to some extent the likelihood 
of favoritism. Since the relative salience of economic goals in larger family firms is likely to be 
greater, the information asymmetries that exist between family owners and nonfamily managers 
are likely to be lower (Chrisman et al., 2014). For these reasons, employment in larger family 
firms is more attractive to nonfamily managers. Therefore, the managerial labor pool will be 
larger, giving family owners the possibility of hiring higher quality personnel. This means that 
the ability of the agents they hire is more likely to offset agency concerns about effort. But again, 
effort tends to follow ability, so family owners will doubly benefit. Together, as better candidates 
are available as the family firm gets larger, and their threat to socioemotional wealth becomes 
less important, the reluctance of family owners to hire nonfamily managers is reduced. 
 
 Hypothesis 3: Firm size moderates the relationship between family ownership and 
nonfamily management such that the hypothesized negative relationship becomes weaker 
in larger firms. 
 
Firm Size, Succession Intentions, and the Employment of Nonfamily Managers 
 
Besides the altruistic tendency of the owning family to maintain family control mentioned above, 
transgenerational succession intentions can also indicate a long-term strategic orientation 
designed to sustain firm prosperity and family ownership across generations (James, 1999; Le 
Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006). This strategic idiosyncrasy of family firms has implications with 
regard to the role of nonfamily managers as the firm gets larger. To the extent transgenerational 
succession is valued by family owners, the economic and noneconomic interests of the family 
converge in the long term, because firm survival and prosperity usually requires reinvestment 
and innovation (Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011). Furthermore, transgenerational succession requires 
family members who are willing and able to assume leadership and ownership positions in the 
future. As noted by Sharma et al. (2003) and De Massis et al. (2008), this at least in part depends 
on the financial prospects of the firm. Thus, the short-term socioemotional sacrifice of hiring 
nonfamily managers may diminish as firm size and complexity increase, owing to the 
socioemotional benefits associated with favorable long-term performance expectations. 
 
Although hiring nonfamily managers may arguably reduce the possibility that the owning family 
altruistically satisfies individual family members' short-term needs, the long-term needs of the 
firm and family are often better fulfilled by hiring more capable nonfamily managers rather than 
solely relying on family managers with limited capabilities (Bennedsen et al., 2007; Sonfield & 
Lussier, 2009; Vandekerkhof, Steijvers, Hendriks, & Voordeckers, 2014). Hence, for the purpose 
of sustaining the potential for the transgenerational prosperity of the business, the owning family 
may be more willing to hire nonfamily managers as the firm gets larger. To conclude, the 
socioemotional risks in hiring nonfamily managers as discussed in Hypothesis 2 are less salient 
in larger firms where the short-term risks to family control do not loom as large and the value of 
nonfamily managers' contributions to the long-term probability of survival of the firm increase. 
 
In addition, firm size may also change the effect of transgenerational succession intention on the 
preferences of nonfamily managers. For instance, Roberts, Sawbridge, and Bamber (1992) 
suggested that informal styles of management become less prevalent when firms grow larger. In 
this regard, family-centered culture and identity conflicts may be reduced (Shepherd & 
Haynie, 2009), and their effect on employment of nonfamily managers may diminish as family 
firms get larger. Similarly, a long-term orientation that values economic performance may be 
more suited to nonfamily managers, attenuating the negative labor market sorting typically 
associated with family firms. Hence, when transgenerational succession intentions remain salient 
as the firm gets larger, high-quality nonfamily managers may be more willing to work in a 
family firm, thereby increasing the benefits of employing nonfamily managers. Taken together, 
we expect that the negative effect of transgenerational succession intentions will be less salient in 
larger family firms. 
 
 Hypothesis 4: Firm size moderates the relationship between transgenerational succession 
intentions and nonfamily management, such that the hypothesized negative relationship 
becomes weaker. 
 
Methodology: 
 
To test our hypotheses, we used an existing database drawing from annual surveys of clients of 
the Small Business Development Center (SBDC) program. Overall, the SBDC received 67,976 
responses to its surveys between 2004 and 2010 from throughout the United States. The effective 
response rate was approximately 18%. The main informant of the survey was the principal 
manager of each firm who in most cases was also the primary owner. T-tests comparing early 
and late respondents to the survey along the variables of interest indicate that nonresponse bias is 
not a problem (Kanuk & Berenson, 1975; Oppenheim, 1966). Additionally, an ex-ante cluster 
analysis illustrates that the firms in our sample conform to the findings of prior research, namely 
that firms with greater family ownership also exhibit greater intentions for transgenerational 
succession (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2004; Zellweger et al., 2012). 
 
In order to effectively test our hypotheses, we applied a series of restrictions. We exclude firms 
without family involvement in ownership, since such firms would by definition have no family 
managers, reducing our sample to 40,793. Since our purpose is to study firms with management 
teams, we also exclude respondents with less than two managers, further decreasing our sample 
to 19,862. Additionally, we exclude preventures that did not go into business and responses with 
missing data resulting in a cleaned dataset of 10,317 firms. Finally, we restricted the sample to 
firms with a minimum of five and maximum of 500 employees in order to ensure that firms in 
the sample possess both an adequate employee-to-manager ratio, can be accurately defined as a 
small business following accepted measures (Small Business Administration, 2014), and the 
direct effect of size on nonfamily management is minimized. After implementing these controls, 
the final sample size of our analysis was 7,299 privately held SMEs. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
The absolute number of nonfamily managers in a family firm does not necessarily capture the 
level of nonfamily management, because the size of the management team can also vary. 
Therefore, in order to encapsulate the presence of nonfamily managers relative to family 
managers, we divided the number of nonfamily managers by the total number of managers in 
each firm to obtain the measure of nonfamily management. On average, approximately 42.7% 
(standard deviation [SD] = 33.2%) of the managers of the firms in our sample were from outside 
the family. 
 
Independent Variable 
 
Family ownership is measured via the percentage of firm ownership by members of the same 
family. The mean family ownership was 90.6% (SD = 21.0%). Succession intentions are 
measured by the question, “Do you wish/expect that the future successor as president of your 
business will be a family member?” We create a dummy in which one (1) denotes an answer of 
“yes,” whereas zero (0) means “no.” On average, about 53.6% of the respondents indicated an 
intention to pass the leadership of the firm onto family members. 
 
Moderator 
 
The mean number of employees of firms in our sample was 21.83, with a minimum of five and 
maximum of 500 employees. Due to the asymmetrical distribution, firm size is measured by the 
logarithm of the number of employees in the current fiscal year. In our robustness tests, we use 
the log of sales revenues as an alternative measure of firm size. 
 
Control Variables 
 
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2004; Schulze et al., 2001), we controlled 
for past performance, firm age, and industry. Past performance (mean = 10.6; SD = 2.0) is 
measured by firm productivity, operationalized by the log of firm sales divided by the number of 
employees in the previous year (for firms with no sales or employees in the previous year, the 
value of the variable was set to zero). Firm age (mean = 14.1; SD = 17.2) is measured by the 
number of years since the firm was established. Even though the regression analyses do not 
appear to be affected by multicollinearity, since firm age is significantly correlated with firm size 
(r = .25), we conducted a post hoc interquartile analysis to ensure that the relationship between 
size and age does not affect the validity of our results. 
 
We controlled for industry using three dummies representing retail, service, and manufacturing 
sectors, respectively. Firms in other industries were coded as zero for each variable. In addition, 
we use a series of dummy variables to measure both the period in which the survey was 
conducted (2004–2010) to control for the possibility of periodic fluctuations, and the state where 
the firms were located to account for possible differences in geographic regions (Chang, 
Chrisman, Chua, & Kellermanns, 2008). 
 
Analysis 
 
The descriptive analysis and correlation matrix of all variables, including dependent, 
independent, control, and instrumental variables are listed in Table 1. The variance inflation 
factor (VIF) for all of the variables are lower than 10. Combing the correlations among the 
independent variables, moderators, control, and instrumental variables, there does not appear to 
be a significant multicollinearity problem in this study. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive and Correlation Analysis 
 
 
 
Instrumental Variables: Controlling for Endogeneity 
We also controlled for the endogeneity of family ownership, because the results could be 
affected by reverse causality or latent factors that were not included in the model. Following 
Hamilton and Nickerson (2003), we used a two-stage regression approach with instrumental 
variables. The key to controlling for endogeneity is to find instrumental variables that are 
strongly related to the focal variables, but unrelated to the dependent variable. The instrumental 
variables used were founder control, equity financing, and Small Business Administration 
(SBA)-guaranteed loans. Founder control is measured as a categorical variable in which one (1) 
denotes situations where the founder has at least a 50% share in firm ownership and zero (0) 
denotes situations where the founder does not. Equity financing and SBA loans were measured 
by the logarithm of the reported amount of equity capital and SBA-guaranteed debt financing 
raised by clients during the period of analysis, respectively. These variables were coded as zero 
for firms that did not obtain any equity financing and/or SBA loans during the period in question. 
 
These three instrumental variables were expected to be strongly related to family ownership. The 
firm's founder is an integral family stakeholder (Gersick, Davis, Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997), 
and his/her influence may persist even when he/she is no longer in control of the firm 
(Eddleston, 2008). In addition, the owning family may favor loans that reduce control the least, 
i.e., debt is preferred to outside equity (Chua, Chrisman, Kellermanns, & Wu, 2011). On the 
other hand, the instruments were not expected to be as strongly related to nonfamily management 
as they are to family ownership or firm growth. Indeed, as seen in Table 1, the correlations 
between the instrumental variables and the independent variables were consistently higher than 
the correlations between the instrumental variables and the dependent variable, suggesting that 
our selection of instrumental variables is reasonable. 
 
Endogeneity Tests 
 
In Model 1 (first stage), the three instruments, moderator, and controls were used to estimate 
family ownership (Table 2, Model 1). As expected, we found that the coefficients of both 
founder's control (B = 16.58, p < .001) and SBA loans (B = 0.08, p < .10) were significantly 
positive, whereas equity financing is significantly negative (B = −0.59, p < .001). In addition, 
these three estimators were found to be jointly significant (F-statistics = 466.15, p < .001). As 
will be further discussed, the predicted family ownership obtained in Model 1 is used in the 
second-stage regressions concerning the employment of nonfamily managers (Table 2, Models 
2–5). However, the actual values of family ownership were later used in robustness tests.2 
 
Table 2. Regression Analysis 
 
 
 
Regression Results 
 
Because family-owned firms often favor family management, the dependent variable is 0 in a 
significant portion of the observations in the second stage. Thus, ordinary least square regression 
may yield biased results. To guard against this possibility, we used Tobit regression for our 
primary analysis in the second stage to generate more precise estimations. White's (1980) 
method for variance correction of the error terms was applied to adjust for the potential impacts 
of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in both first- and second-stage analyses. 
 
We follow the hierarchical approach in reporting the regression results. In the first step, control 
variables were entered (Table 2, Model 2). We found that past performance (B = 1.04, p < .001), 
age (B = −0.03, p < .01), and manufacturing industry (B = 8.92, p < .001) were significantly 
related to employment of nonfamily managers. The independent variables are entered in the 
second step (Table 2, Model 3). In support of hypotheses 1 and 2, the coefficients for both the 
family ownership (B = −0.29, p < .001) and succession intentions variables (B = −26.08, p < .001) 
were significantly negative. The moderator (firm size) is entered in step three (Table 2, Model 4); 
as expected, the coefficient of firm size was positive and significant. The interactions between 
the independent variables and moderator were entered in step four (Table 2, Model 5). Here, the 
coefficient of firm size becomes negative and nonsignificant. In support of hypotheses 3 and 4, 
both the interaction of family ownership and firm size (B = 0.19, p < .001) and the interaction of 
succession intentions and firm size (B = 3.354, p < .001) were positive and significant. These 
findings suggest that the effect of firm size on the employment of nonfamily managers is largely 
dependent upon the trade-offs between their benefits and costs to the firm rather than just an 
imbalance between the supply of family managers and the demand for managers of the firm. 
 
To illustrate the significant interactions regarding hypotheses 3 and 4, we plot the moderation 
effects of firm size from Model 5 of the Tobit regressions. As shown in Figure 1, the larger firms 
in our sample generally have higher levels of nonfamily management than smaller firms. 
Consistent with hypothesis 3, the downward slope of the nonfamily management variable for 
larger family firms becomes gentler as family ownership increases, meaning that the demand for 
nonfamily managers does not vary as much according to family ownership for larger family 
firms as it does for smaller family firms. In support of hypothesis 4 (Figure 2), a similar 
moderation effect was found regarding the negative impact of succession intention on nonfamily 
management; the reduction in the use of nonfamily managers among firms with transgenerational 
succession intentions is lower in larger firms than that in smaller ones. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robustness Tests 
 
In order to ensure the robustness of the results presented in the previous section, we performed 
several additional tests. 3 First, we ran the analysis using the actual rather than the predicted 
values for the family ownership variable. Second, we changed our measure of firm size from the 
log of total employment to the log of total sales. Third, we changed the size threshold from 500 
to 250 employees to meet alternative boundary conditions for the classification of SMEs 
(European Commission, 2003). In all cases, we obtained results that were consistent with the 
main analyses reported above. 
 
Finally, we ran an interquartile analysis based on the distribution of firm age. This analysis 
indicated that our findings are robust across all age ranges, with the exception of newly founded 
firms. Interestingly, and related to the counterintuitive correlation between age and family 
ownership discussed in footnote 2, the positive relationship one might anticipate between firm 
age and the prevalence of nonfamily managers occurred only for firms less than 5 years old. 
However, this relationship deteriorated and eventually reversed, as older and older firms were 
included in the analysis. We believe that the results pertaining to firm age in our study are likely 
a function of (1) firms with owners that are only partially committed to transgenerational family 
control selling out over time, and (2) firms with owners with strong family commitments 
maintaining or increasing their control as they evolve. Further research is needed, however, to 
determine if this conjecture is valid. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In this study, we develop and test a model of the impact of family ownership and 
transgenerational succession intentions on decisions regarding the employment of nonfamily 
managers, and how firm size moderates those relationships. Results from Tobit regression 
analyses lend support to our hypotheses, which have both theoretical and practical implications. 
The current study contributes to the literature in at least three ways. First, we present empirical 
evidence that the employment of nonfamily managers by family firms is influenced by family 
ownership and transgenerational succession intentions. Although these forces have long been 
discussed in the family business literature (e.g., Schulze et al., 2001; Zellweger et al., 2012), we 
provide a comprehensive model for their study by simultaneously considering the influence of 
agency theory and socioemotional wealth. Furthermore, we enrich the model by considering how 
the preferences of nonfamily managers and the resulting quality of the managerial labor pool can 
uniquely influence these relationships. Overall, consistent with Chrisman et al.'s (2014) 
conceptual work, our findings suggest that both the economic and noneconomic goals of family 
owners and the supply and demand considerations of the market need to be taken more fully into 
account when studying the role of nonfamily managers in family firms. 
 
Second, our findings suggest that firm size may influence the way family firms respond to trade-
offs in the potential for nonfamily managers to contribute to economic and noneconomic goals 
(Kotlar, De Massis, Fang, & Frattini, 2013). Size has long been considered an important control 
variable in family business research, and Gómez-Mejía et al. (2011) have argued that size is an 
important contingency variable that might influence the relationship between socioemotional 
wealth and family firm decision making. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that the concerns of 
family owners change as firms grow larger and/or the stakes of family involvement become 
greater. However, few studies have examined the nuances of how traditional control variables 
such as size affect family firm behavior. Family business research is still in its early stages of 
development, and as our understanding of family business relationships and theory becomes 
more refined, there is a greater need to test the applicability, or the extent, to which assumptions 
found in general management studies apply to family firms. Namely, although the separation 
between ownership and control becomes more useful as firms grow (Fama & Jensen, 1983), the 
process through which this occurs in family firms, and its unique outcomes, have yet to be 
studied. Size itself can have important implications regarding the strategic decisions and 
performance outcomes in family firms (Kotey, 2005; Stewart & Hitt, 2012; Vandekerkhof 
et al., 2014), because it is both a cause and a consequence of rising levels of aspirations and 
achievements. Therefore, in family firms in particular, increased size is likely to change the 
nature of the underlying goals, governance, and resources (Chua et al., 2012). For research using 
econometric analyses, this means that the slopes instead of the intercept are likely to be affected. 
Our findings contribute to a better understanding of these relationships. 
The results of our full model show that in terms of nonfamily management, the direct effect of 
firm size is insignificant, whereas the interactive effects with family ownership and succession 
intentions are significant. This suggests that firm size may impact family firms in unique ways 
through its interaction with other important variables such as family ownership and succession 
intentions, not currently explored in general management research. Indeed, a fuller investigation 
of the impact of firm size and other variables, typically treated merely as controls, may aid our 
understanding of the strategies of family firms in different competitive situations. 
 
Third, the current study is embedded in the ongoing discussion of the heterogeneity of family 
firms (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Sharma, 2004; Stewart & Hitt, 2012; Westhead & 
Howorth, 2007). Although extensive evidence has been found to suggest that family firms are 
strategically and behaviorally distinct from nonfamily firms, their unique characteristics may 
manifest in various ways (Chua et al., 2012), and in various contexts (Wright, Chrisman, Chua, 
& Steier, 2014), making family firms a vastly heterogeneous group (Melin & Nordqvist, 2007). 
Our findings suggest that family ownership and transgenerational succession are two distinctive 
yet complementary aspects that stimulate the nature of family firms' decision making. Furthering 
this claim, we posit that the size of family firms alters their propensity to hire nonfamily 
managers, because the threats posed by nonfamily managers diminish as firms grow while their 
abilities to benefit the firm increase. Thus, by exposing a factor that affects and is affected by a 
firm's goals, governance, and resources, firm size may help explain the heterogeneity among the 
family business population, and further study may help explain how family firms of different 
sizes strategically pursue and balance economic and noneconomic goals, particularly when a 
long-term perspective is taken. 
 
Limitations 
 
Although we endeavored to ensure the theoretical and empirical integrity of our research, there 
are several limitations of our study that must be recognized. First, although our focus on SME 
family firms minimizes the probability that the larger firms in our sample had no choice but to 
hire nonfamily managers owing to an insufficient number of available family members, it does 
not eliminate that possibility. Even if the effect of firm size appears to be insignificant when 
interactive terms are added, supporting our underlying theory, we recognize that there may be 
additional dynamics regarding the authority and power of family principals to control managerial 
hiring as the firm grows, which have not been taken into account in our study. 
Second, our examination of the possibility of endogeneity among our variables was constrained 
by data limitations. Therefore, reverse causality and omitted variable bias cannot be entirely 
ruled out. Indeed, not unlike other studies of family firms, our multidimensional arguments 
emerge at the apex of economic and noneconomic goals, family and nonfamily managers, and 
principal and agent perspectives, each of which presents multiple avenues for endogeneity 
threats. Even though we endeavored to ensure the validity of our results through a battery of 
endogeneity and robustness tests, we wholly recognize the nascent stage of this line of inquiry 
and the need for its further development. 
 
Third, our sample came from the clients of a public provider of consulting services to privately 
held SMEs in the United States. Thus, only firms who sought consulting services were included 
in our population. Although we see no reason that the nature of our sample would have affected 
the results, we cannot rule out the possibility of selection bias and other limits to the 
generalizability of the results. 
 
Fourth, although it is arguable that family control and succession intentions are primary concerns 
in family-owned businesses (Gersick et al., 1997), and have been studied extensively in the 
literature (Zellweger et al., 2012), more comprehensive measures of the components, essence, 
and socioemotional wealth of family firms should be developed and tested (Berrone et al., 2012; 
Chua et al., 1999). Furthermore, although our categorical measure of transgenerational 
succession intentions has precedence (Chrisman et al., 2012), it does not possess the same level 
of internal validity as would a multi-item scale. 
 
Finally, although our theory acknowledges the importance of the willingness of nonfamily 
managers to work in family firms and the ability of family firms to effectively attract nonfamily 
managers, we do not directly measure such variables. Even though we ground our arguments in 
recent theory and research, further research that more directly measures the willingness of both 
family firm principals and nonfamily agents concerning employment in family firms may greatly 
strengthen this aspect of our model. 
 
Future Research Directions 
 
Future research should address the limitations of this study. However, there are other research 
avenues that tie into the theoretical and practical implications of our findings. First, although we 
focus on the employment of nonfamily managers, as they represent one of the most important 
strategic issues in family firms (Chua et al., 2003), the difference between smaller and larger 
family firms in terms of innovation and internationalization, the employment of in-laws or 
members of the extended family, supply chain management, the management of collaborative 
networks, and other topics are also worthy of study. 
 
Second, we attempt to capture the difference between smaller and larger family firms. However, 
firm growth involves a temporal dimension. Although this study is cross-sectional in nature and 
did take firm age into account, there are likely to be other aspects of family firm behavior that 
require longitudinal study. Indeed, we found that age is positively related to family ownership 
and negatively related to the proportion of nonfamily managers among the firms included in our 
study. These findings are not inconsistent with prior work (Chua, Chrisman, & Chang, 2004), but 
since they are based on cross-sectional rather than longitudinal analyses, further work is needed 
to fully comprehend the implications. Similarly, further research on the determinants and 
consequences of economic and noneconomic goals in SME family firms as they age or pass from 
generation to generation would be useful. 
 
Third, the theory underlying our study suggests a variety of other factors that may influence 
managerial employment decisions in family firms, such as the number and degree of 
involvement of family owners, strategic initiatives, and the industry environment (e.g., Fang, 
Memili, Chrisman, & Penney, Forthcoming). The influence of these factors may have 
independent, interactive, or complementary effects that need to be understood. 
 
Finally, there is a need for research conducted from the perspective of nonfamily managerial 
applicants before and after they are hired to understand how they view the opportunities and 
challenges for career advancement in family firms. Studies that explore the methods through 
which nonfamily managers are hired, trained, evaluated, and compensated would also be valued 
(Chrisman et al., 2014; Memili, Misra, Chang, & Chrisman, 2013). The consequences of these 
decisions in terms of firm performance and employee turnover are also important to better 
understand how family owners expect nonfamily managers to contribute to the firm. Thus, 
interdisciplinary research regarding the human resource management practices and strategies 
employed by family firms may provide invaluable additional perspectives. 
 
Future Research Directions 
 
Future research should address the limitations of this study. However, there are other research 
avenues that tie into the theoretical and practical implications of our findings. First, although we 
focus on the employment of nonfamily managers, as they represent one of the most important 
strategic issues in family firms (Chua et al., 2003), the difference between smaller and larger 
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members of the extended family, supply chain management, the management of collaborative 
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Second, we attempt to capture the difference between smaller and larger family firms. However, 
firm growth involves a temporal dimension. Although this study is cross-sectional in nature and 
did take firm age into account, there are likely to be other aspects of family firm behavior that 
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and negatively related to the proportion of nonfamily managers among the firms included in our 
study. These findings are not inconsistent with prior work (Chua, Chrisman, & Chang, 2004), but 
since they are based on cross-sectional rather than longitudinal analyses, further work is needed 
to fully comprehend the implications. Similarly, further research on the determinants and 
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involvement of family owners, strategic initiatives, and the industry environment (e.g., Fang, 
Memili, Chrisman, & Penney, Forthcoming). The influence of these factors may have 
independent, interactive, or complementary effects that need to be understood. 
 
Finally, there is a need for research conducted from the perspective of nonfamily managerial 
applicants before and after they are hired to understand how they view the opportunities and 
challenges for career advancement in family firms. Studies that explore the methods through 
which nonfamily managers are hired, trained, evaluated, and compensated would also be valued 
(Chrisman et al., 2014; Memili, Misra, Chang, & Chrisman, 2013). The consequences of these 
decisions in terms of firm performance and employee turnover are also important to better 
understand how family owners expect nonfamily managers to contribute to the firm. Thus, 
interdisciplinary research regarding the human resource management practices and strategies 
employed by family firms may provide invaluable additional perspectives. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, our study shows that family ownership and transgenerational succession intentions 
significantly influence the employment of nonfamily managers in family firms and that firm size 
moderates these relationships. Although firm size is often used as a control variable, its 
importance as a moderator has generally been overlooked. We hope that these findings will 
inspire researchers to more closely investigate other fundamental relationships rather than take 
for granted that such relationships pertaining to nonfamily firms also apply to family firms. 
 
Footnotes 
 
1. We recognize that these relationships are further accentuated among large firms with 
more than 500 employees. 
 
2. An interesting and somewhat counterintuitive result in Model 1 is the positive 
relationship between age and family ownership. However, the work of Chua et al. (2004) 
suggest that even though most family firms are founded as such, over time, the proportion 
of family firms in the population of firms tends to increase. Furthermore, in SMEs, it is 
unusual for the family to relinquish control of their firm (e.g., Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). 
Therefore, it is plausible that family ownership increases as firms get older. 
 
3. The detailed results of the robustness tests are available from the corresponding author 
upon request. 
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